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CHRONIC HARM

INTRODUCTION
I.
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND THE ANTI -ARCHIVE
II. CHRONIC HARM: REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND THE
EXPLOITATION OF CARE LABOR
INTRODUCTION

In this Article, I argue that critical race feminism provides a lens
for dismantling the current system ofU.S.laws that regulate labor
and reproduction, a set of laws that are often represented as unrelated race- and gender-neutral public policies in legal decisions and
in dominant media. Critical race feminism challenges this framing of
the relation between public policy, power, and identity through the
mechanism of counter-narrative. Following other feminist theorists
that conceptualize the law as archive, I show how contemporary
feminists have developed an anti-archive of counter-narrative that
generates alternative models for linking bodily integrity and social
welfare. To demonstrate the usefulness of this anti-archive to legal
studies, I examine the dominant discourse found in two case studies
to show how feminist counter-narratives challenge this discourse: the
Supreme Court case Buck v. Bell (1927) and current attempts by victims of forced sterilization to claim reparations in Virginia and North
Carolina; 1 and Harris v. Quinn (2014), a case in which the Supreme
Court decided that care attendants in the home, supported by
Medicaid funds, could not be compelled to pay union dues. 2 Feminist
counter-narratives allow for links between the cases, demonstrating
that these public policies take form as part of institutional oppression that targets low-income women, especially women of color. 3
* Ann Kennedy is a Professor of Women's and Gender Studies and First-Year
Writing at University of Maine-Farmington. She is the author of Historicizing PostDiscourses: Postfeminism and Postracialism in United States Culture (SUNY Press 2017)
The author would like to the thank the editors of the Journal for their careful preparation of the Article for publication and to dedicate the Article to reproductive justice
activists everywhere.
1. Buck v. Bell, 247 U.S. 200 (1927); see Sarah Brightman et al., State-Directed
Sterilizations in North Carolina: Victim-Centered ness and Reparations, 55 BRITISH J.
CRIMINOWGY 474, 474--93 (2015); see generally KEviN BEGOS ET AL., AGAINST THEIR
WILL: NORTH CAROLINA'S STERILIZATION PRoGRAM (Gray Oak Books, 2012).
2. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014).
3. See Brightman et al., supra note 1, at 477.
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In the 1980s, a scholar activist movement of students and
faculty of color developed a set of methods and frameworks in legal
studies known as critical race theory (CRT), an "articulation of
racial power, one that eschewed the reigning frames that worked to
reduce racism to matters of individual prejudice or a by-product of
class."4 Recognizing the failure of liberal reform to "address the
institutional, structural and ideological reproduction of racial hierarchy,"5 critical race theory "questions the very foundations of the
liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law ." 6
Critical race theory has been instrumental in demonstrating how
"neutraf' institutions of the state reproduce racial hierarchy-in
ideologies of color blindness, in adherence to individualism, and in
the production and reproduction of identity as hierarchy through a
narrow assimilationist logics-and contesting these institutions. 7
In 1989 and 1991, Kimberle Crenshaw, a founding CRT theorist
and a co-founder and Executive Director of the Mrican American
Policy Forum, published two articles introducing intersectionality
as a conceptual method for reframing antidiscrimination law, feminist theory and activism, and Black studies and the Civil Rights
Movement to address Black women's structural, political, and
representational oppression. 8 She demonstrated that in every site
ofinstitutional and social power, the experiences and voices ofBlack
women are marginalized by the dominant frame that uses singleaxis conceptions of identity to understand constructions of social
reality.9 Crenshaw argues that Black women's discrimination claims
cannot be addressed within preexisting legal constructs: "problems
of exclusion cannot be solved simply by including Black women
within an already established analytical structure."10 Thus, her
work extends CRT's critique of assimilationist reform as a means of
creating substantive transformation of state and social institutions
4. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking
Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV., 1253, 1260 (2011).
5. Id. at 1262.
6. RICHARDDELGADO&JEANSTEFANCIC,CRITICALR.ACETHEORY:ANINTRODUCTION

3 (3d ed. NYU Press 2011).
7. See Crenshaw, supra note 4, at 1253-54.
8. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection ofRace and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F., 139, 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection]; Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Vwlence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv.
1241, 1242-44 (1991).
9 . See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection, supra note 8, at 139.
10. See id. at 140.
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and instead focuses on the reconceptualization of dominant paradigms used to regulate and represent identity. 11 Cho, Crenshaw, and
McCall argue that
what makes an analysis intersectional ... is its adoption of an
intersectional way of thinking about the problem of sameness and
difference and its relation to power. This framing-conceiving of
categories not as distinct but as always permeated by other
categories, fluid and changing, always in the process of creating
and being created by dynamics of power--emphasizes what intersectionality does rather than what intersectionality is .... Intersectionality is inextricably linked to an analysis of power ... .
The recasting ofintersectionality as a theory primarily fascinated
with the infinite combinations and implications of overlapping
identities from an analytic initially concerned with structures of
power and exclusion is curious given the explicit references to
structures that appear in much of the early work. 12

In her early theorizations ofintersectionality, Crenshaw also focuses
on its roots in Black feminist social activism stretching back to the
abolitionist and women's rights struggles of the nineteenth century,
demonstrating that intersectionality is a Black feminist way of knowing developed in Black feminist social movements and in coalitional
work with others such as Black men, other women of color, and white
feminists. 13 Crenshaw's work itself can be categorized as part of"an
evolving tradition" of women of color legal scholarship that Adrien
Katherine Wing identified as "Critical Race Feminism." 14 Several
key components of Crenshaw's theorizations and, more broadly, of
critical race feminist work are often omitted when put into social
movement and institutional practice or when appropriated across
different fields of research. 15 However, it is not my purpose here to
examine either the critiques ofintersectionality and critical race feminism, or the use and misuses of intersectionality across disciplines
and in contemporary feminist scholarship and activism. 16 Instead,
in Part I, I introduce the methods in critical race feminism that allow
11. See id. at 159.
12. Sumi Cho et al., Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications,
and Praxis, 38 SIGNS 785, 797 (2013).
13. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection, supra note 8, at 140, 152.
14. CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 2 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., NYU Press
1997) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM].
15. See Cho et al., supra note 12, at 788-89.
16. See id. at 787--88. Recent discussions of those debates include a special issue of
Signs 38 (2013). See also ANNA CARASTATIITS, lNTERSECTIONALITY: ORIGINS, CONTESTA·
TIONS, HORIZONS, 125 (Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2016); VIVIAN M. MAY, PuRsillNG INTERSECTIONAIJTY, UNSETTLING DOMINANT IMAGINARIES 2 (2015).
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feminist theorists to challenge prima facie neutral laws of gender
and race and demonstrate that they form a network of laws and
public policies targeting low-income, predominantly women of color.
I. REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND THE ANTI-ARCHIVE
In Movement Intersectionality, critical race theorists Dorothy
Roberts and Sujatha Jesudason argue that
intersectionalityforces us to break through these [identity] categories to examine how they are related to each other and how
they make certain identities invisible. This shift from seeing our
differences to seeing our relatedness requires that we understand identity categories in terms of matrices of power that are
connected rather than solely as features of individuals that
separate us . . .. [T]he radical potential for intersectionality lies
in moving beyond its recognition of difference to build political
coalitions based on the recognition of connections among systems of oppression as well as on a shared vision of social justice.
The process of grappling with differences, discovering and creating
commonalities, and revealing interactive mechanisms of oppression itself provides a model for alternative social relationships. 17

One social movement that develops almost simultaneously and from
the same set of methodological frameworks as critical race feminism
is the reproductive justice movement. As Roberts and Jesudason
argue, "[r]eproductive justice is a prime example of applying an intersectional framework to both political theorizing and political
action." 18 The reproductive justice framework developed from the
activism of women of color in the 1990s, although its roots are in
earlier women of color and socialist feminisms in the 1970s, such as
the Committee to End Sterilization Abuse, the National Welfare
Rights Organization, Women of All Red Nations (WARN), and
Chicana activists who helped fight the sterilization of predominantly Chicana women in California in the case of Madrigal v.
Quillen, the Indian Health Services record of coerced sterilizations,
and eventually change the sterilization consent standards at HEW. 19
17. Dorothy Roberts & Sujatha Jesudason, Movement Intersectionality: the Case of
Race, Gender, Disability, and Genetic Technologies, 10 Du BOIS REV., 313, 316 (2013)
(citation omitted).
18. ld.
19. See UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE
10 (Jael Silliman et al. eds., South End Press 2d ed. 20 16); NANCY ORDOVER, AMERICAN
EUGENICS: RACE, QUEER, ANATOMY AND THE SCIENCE OF NATIONALISM, 183 (U. Minn.
Press 2003); Maya Manian, The Story of Madrigal v. Quilligan: Coerced Sterilization of
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Their experiences with public hospitals and doctors; social workers;
welfare offices; the Indian Health Service; the Department ofHealth,
Education, and Welfare; and the passage of the Hyde Amendment
became the basis for contemporary critiques of Roe v. Wade's "right
to privacy" footing as an adequate framework for the securing of
reproductive rights for women of color.
Loretta Ross and Rickie Solinger, in Reproductive Justice: An
Introduction, open the book by defining the movement's principles,
reproductive justice goes beyond the pro-choice/pro-life debate
and has three primary principles: (1) the right not to have a child;
(2) the right to have a child; and (3) the right to parent children
in safe and healthy environments. In addition, reproductive
justice demands sexual autonomy and gender freedom for every
human being. 20

The authors argue that achieving the goals of reproductive justice
requires "access to specific, community-based resources including
high-quality health care, housing and education, a living wage, a
healthy environment, and a safety net for times when these resources fail." 21
One of the methods utilized to organize the reproductive justice
movement is storytelling. Adrien Katherine Wing states that one of
the "comerstone[s]" of CRT is that "a culture constructs its own social
reality in its own self-interest. CRT's critique of society thus often
takes the form of storytelling and narrative analysis-to construct
alternative social realities and protest against acquiescence to unfair
arrangements designed for the benefits of others." 22 Confronted with
political, legal, and cultural systems that framed contemporary identity politics within the discourse ofpostracialism, critical race feminists also tackled the discourse ofpostfeminism, articulating the ways
in which gender-equality laws conceptualized through a single-axis
frame have worked for many individual, predominantly white women,
but have not, in fact, to quote Audre Lorde, "dismantle[d] the master's
house."23 Thus, counter-narratives are not merely stories, but stories
that challenge the hegemonic logic that structures public policy and
Mexican-American Women, U.S.F.L. 1, 7 (forthcoming 2019); Meg Devlin O'Sullivan,
Informing Red Power and Transforming the Second Wave: Native American Women and
the Struggle Against Coerced Sterilization in the 1970s, 25 WOMEN'S HIST. REv., 965, 975
(20 16), for a discussion of the activism of women of color against forced sterilization.
20. LoRETTAJ. ROSS & RICKIE SOIJNGER, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION,
9 (Univ. Cal. Press 2017) (emphasis omitted).
21. Id.
22. CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 14, at 3.
23. AUDRALoRDE, SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 112 (Crossing Press 2007).
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legal decision-making; counter-narratives challenge existing structures that reproduce inequality through the categorical frame of
racist patriarchy, by making that frame visible and by providing
transformative strategies to change normative institutions.
The counter-narratives of critical race feminism are power
analytics and cannot be separated from the explicit desire to transform the legal system-in part by working to center those voices
that have been objectified in the formal and informal hierarchical
processes of that system, but also in gesturing toward new configurations of political movements and new ways of constructing law
and public policy. While many literary theorists and some critical
race scholars associate counter-narrative with empathy and persuasion, I read counter-narrative within the frame of 1970s feminist
consciousness-raising, the purpose ofwhich is not primarily directed
toward goals ofempathy or specificlegal claims. 24 Counter-narrative
has much in common with the practice of consciousness-raising. 25
Consciousness-raising is a primary form of collective identity formation toward decision-making and collective action. 26 As Ross and
Solinger describe it, consciousness-raising is a crucial process in
movement building:
Vulnerable people may recognize the dangers of telling their
truths individually, no matter how much they are dying inside.
So we often work together for strength and safety. In the 1970s,
the women's movement, for example, used storytelling in groups---what was called "consciousness-raising'' then-to interrupt cycles
of gendered silencing and oppression. . . . Storytelling helped
create the national coalition SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective in 1997. SisterSong, the leading proponent ofthe concept reproductive justice in the United States and
abroad, adopted the motto: "Doing collectively what we cannot
do individually'' to reflect its members' conviction that our collective power is based on and derived from our power to tell our
own stories.27

Using the techniques of counter-narrative, a storytelling approach
to the legal system that makes claims based on the experiential
totality of social structures, rather than narrow legal claims based
on adversarial positions means reframing conflicts as products of an
24. See DELGADO & STEFANIC, supra note 6, at 3, 33-35, and 48-49, for a summary
of this debate in CRT.
25. See Ross & SOLINGER, supra note 20, at 60.
26. ld.
27. I d. at 60 (footnote omitted).
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ideological system or as Lisa Ikemoto puts it, entails looking "beyond
the law, to the way that social reality constructs the [legal] conflict."28
Thus, counter-narratives are not in opposition to a dominant "side"
as in a "conflict of interests," or in the "balancing of interests" that
proceeds in the system oflaw, but demonstrate how the legal system
structures social reality in its elision of its own assumptions of
authority, as the ideological structure that frames the procedures of
the legal system. If the interpretative power of the law is structurally located with institutions that have their roots in racist patriarchy, if those institutions continue to draw on that history and to use
the same texts and methods to interpret that history, then it must
be met with tactics, narratives, and interpretations that challenge
the premises of those institutional practices.
Much of this intersectional feminist work is being done in art,
literature, and collective performance practice, particularly in the
building of feminist coalitions around critical race feminism, reproductive justice, and disability rights. In the sections that follow, I
discuss some of this work and its engagement with the legal and
medical archives of eugenics. My purpose is to show how the counternarratives of this feminist work open up the eugenic archive in ways
that work across differences and hierarchies, seeking commonalities
and struggling to find alternative means of addressing the harms of
gender and race oppression in the United States. I argue that this approach has been missing from the justice efforts for victims of eugenic
sterilization in the United States. Finally, I demonstrate how these
works help feminists reconceptualize the relation between reproductive justice and economic justice. As Scott Barclay, Lynn C. Jones,
and Anna-Maria Marshall argue, "[s]ocial movement success arises
not from changing the law per se, but rather in changing the ability
of formerly marginalized groups to now exercise additional power in
the changing dynamic it negotiates through and with the law." 29
Obviously at stake in the reparations programs in states like
North Carolina and Virginia for sterilization victims are the archives that would have remained buried but for the work of Johanna
Schoen, an historian of reproductive rights, gaining access to the
records and sharing them with journalists at the Winston Salem
Journal. 00 This type ofhistorical archival work and the significance
28. CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 14, at 138; Lisa lkemoto, Furthering the
Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women,
59 TENN. L. REV. 487, 487--88 (1992).
29. Scott Barclay, Lynn C. Jones &Anna-MariaMarshall, Two Spinning Wheels: Studying Law and Social Movements, 54 STUDIES IN L. POL., & Soc'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 3 (20 11).
30. See Scott Sexton, Are Victims of Eugenic Sterilization Program Any Closer to a
Fulfillment ofPromises, WINSTON-SALEMJ. (June 29, 20 14), https://www .journalnow.com
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it has for public policy and the law today, however, has been a prominent discussion across the disciplines in the last few decades, evidenced by recent literary and artistic engagements with the archive
that I discuss in this section. 31 Vivian May argues that it is an intersectional framework, in part, that has produced this engagement with
the archives, explaining that
[i]ntersectional reinterpretations (or interruptions) of history ...
are a means of situating oneself, or one's group, within histories of
resistance. Acknowledging this wider trajectory effects an important "rupture" in collective and individual consciousness: it
opens up possibilities, past and present, by denaturalizing oppression and presenting it as an ongoing process, not an accomplished
(and implicitly unchangeable) fact .... [I]n asking whose voices
have been heard, documented, or recognized, intersectionality not
only raises questions about who "counts" as a knower, but also
what counts as evidence of resistance or insurgency: in so doing,
it entails a redefinition of the past, a rethinking of the archive. 32
In contemporary theoretical work on archives, archives are no longer
seen as mere repositories of records, evidence ofpast events, but the
"traces" of those events that link past and future, according to our
own uses of them. 33 As Jacques Derrida argues, "there is no political
power without control of the archive, if not of memory. Effective
democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion:
the participation in and the access to the archive, its constitution,
and its interpretation." 34 To struggle with legal and medical archives
as forms of power, particularly as they have the ability to reproduce
ideological systems of race and gender hierarchy, then, requires
unconventional methods to "excavate" the human subjects dehumanized in their records. 35 Chandan Reddy argues that,
[l]ike all archives, the law ... as an archive is not simply an
institutional site for the recording of the past and of historical and
social difference. Rather, it is a framework that, ironically, promises its reader agency only through the perpetual subjugation of
/news/columnists/scott_sextonlare-victims-of-eugenic-sterilization-program-any-closer-to
-a/article_7aa32894-0ab8-56bb-ac33-de703be3f271.html [https://perma.cciMA75-GTTZ];
see also Kevin Begos, Read This: Records Unexpectedly Available, in AGAINST THEIR
WILL: NORTH CAROLINA'S STERILIZATION PRoGRAM 33 (Gray Oak Books 20 12).
31. See Sexton, supra note 30.
32. MAY, supra note 16, at 56 (citation omitted).
33. See id. at 189.
34. JACQUES DERRIDA, ARCHIVE FEvER: A FREUDIAN IMPRESSION 11 (Eric Prenowitz,
Univ. of Chi. Press, 1996).
35. MAY, supra note 16, at 58.

2018]

CHRONIC HARM

139

differences, a subjugation, then, that targets not only the past
but also the future. Indeed the law as an archive addressed to
the citizen or potential subject of"civility" seeks, above all, to be
an archive ofthe future. 36
The feminist anti-archive, then, not only challenges the social architecture of the past, but demonstrates how the archive limits our
understanding of the past to that
[e]mpty homogeneous time [that] is the utopian time of capital.
It linearly connects past, present, and future, creating the possi-

bility for all of those historicist imaginings of identity, nationhood, progress, and so on that [Benedict] Anderson, along with
many others have made familiar to us. But empty homogenous
time is not located anywhere in real space-it is utopian. The
real space of modern life consists of heterotopia.... Time here
is heterogeneous, unevenly dense. 37
One example of this kind of archival engagement as collective
resistance is the "Anarcha Project," a performance collective on the
stories ofAnarcha, Betsey, and Lucy, the three enslaved black women
who were subjected to serial surgeries at the hands ofMarion Simms,
memorialized as the father of gynecology. 38 One of its organizers,
Petra Kuppers, writes in Remembering Anarcha.· Objection in the
Medical Archive, that 11 [t]he archives of medicine give me little help
in accessing the being-in-the-world experienced by someone other
than myself.... The distance the archive enacts, the 'objective'
abstraction necessary to the generation of data, keeps me away." 39
Kuppers argues that the systemic domination that produces some
human subjects for experimentation is part ofthe architecture ofthe
archival record. 40 In the case of Anarcha, Betsey, and Lucy, the antiarchive seeks some form of representation that Kuppers calls a
"sticky web" that makes us more "sensitive to the level of interpretation" and 11claim[s] that surround[] historical embodiment" without
further objectifying victims.'11 The creative act of decolonizing the
archive means bringing heterogeneity to concepts of historical time,
36. Chandan Reddy, Diaspora, Asylum and Family, in INTERSECTIONALITY: A FOUNDATIONS AND FRoNTIERS READER 29 (Patrick R. Grzanka, ed., Westview Press, 2014).
37. P ARTHA CHATrERJEE, THE POLITICS OF THE GoVERNED: REFLECTIONS ON POPULAR
POLITICS IN MOST OF THE WORLD, 6-7 (Colum. U. Press 2004).
38. Petra Kuppers, Anarcha Project Essay, LIMINALITIES: J. PERFORMANCE STUD. 4.2
(2008).
39. Id.
40. I d. at 2-3.
41. ld. at6.
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so that feminist anti-archives depend on a creative weaving of new
connections between past and present that are neither there, waiting to be found, nor linear in their address to the future. In this
way, the creative projects discussed here create that "sticky web"
between past and present formations of reproductive oppression to
imagine futures of reproductive justice, showing how dependent
those reparative claims are on epistemic witnessing.
Over the course ofthe last two decades, Carrie Buck has emerged
as an important historical figure because she was chosen as a constitutional test case for eugenicist Harry Laughlin's model sterilization law;42 new scholarly attention to the history of eugenics has
focused on the 1927 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Buck v. Bell
that legalized the sterilization of citizens who had been institutionalized by the state. 43 However, no trace of Carrie Buck's own selfmaking exists to distinguish her from the numerous others sterilized under the more than thirty U.S. state laws passed in the early
twentieth century.44 Buck was a young white woman living with a
foster family, the Dodds, who was raped by one of the family members;
when they discovered her pregnancy the Dodds had her admitted to
the Virginia asylum where her mother was already institutionalized
and where Carrie gave birth to a daughter, Vivian. 46 Medical historians have spent many years "proving'' that Carrie's diagnosis as
''feebleminded" in 1924 was a fabrication, relying on the very records used to sanction her sterilization. 46
The medical-legal and welfare archives leave a rich accounting
of her case-the details of her mental, emotional, and physical
status-but Carrie is subjugated through the archive at the same
time that it claims to give her historical presence. 47 Her name is
archived over and over as part of the process of objectification: her
condition, her medical status, her social status in social worker files,
42. ORDOVER, supra note 19, at 135-36.
43. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,207-08 (1927).
44. ORDOVER, supra note 19, at 134.
45. ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN EUGENICS, AND THE
STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK 28-29 (Penguin Books 2017).
46. See PAUL LoMBARDO, CENTURY OF EUGENICS: FROM THE INDIANA EXPERIMENT TO
THE HUMAN GENOME ERA. (Bloomington: Ind. Univ. Press 2010) (containing most of the
details of Carrie's case and the history of eugenics); see also PAUL LoMBARDO, THREE
GENERATIONS No IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL (John
Hopkins Univ. Press 2008) [hereinafter LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS]; COHEN, supra
note 45. I first remember reading about Carrie Buck's case in SUSAN LURIE, UNSETTLED
SUBJECTS: RESTORING FEMINIST POLITICS TO POSTSTRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE (Duke Univ.
Press 1997) and DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION,
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (Vintage Books 1997).
4 7. See sources cited, supra note 46.
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asylum files, eugenics records, letters between doctors and eugenicists
and lawyers, court files, and transcripts. 48 These institutional documents construct the epistemology in which Carrie is named and
renamed, in the medical records as "feebleminded"; by Justice Holmes
as an "imbecile"; in the words of Albert Priddy, the superintendent
of the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded, where
Carrie was an inmate; Carrie is of the type of "the shiftless, ignorant, and worthless class of antisocial whites of the South."49
These are definitions of Carrie, not descriptions of any condition
that she may have had. She embodies a condition that afflicts society,
a difference that threatens ("worthless" "shiftless" and "anti-social")
its well-being. 5° In Carrie's case, we can see, as Reddy argues, that
the archive is a site for the regulation of difference as hierarchy. 51
According to Reddy, understanding the limited epistemology of the
archives requires asking:
how regulation marks its interest in difference .... requires reading these figures [of the archive] against the grain of the archive,
situating that archive within and against the social formationthe forces and relations that constitute it .... to read the figure
as the limit of the archive, the point at which the archive's own
conditions for existence might be retraced. 62

In the twenty-first century, Carrie became a figure of interest
to historians of the eugenic project, but also to feminists, particularly those invested in reproductive justice-perhaps because she
figures not at all in the feminist archives of the 1920s. 53 Feminist
approaches to the archive ask not about the evidence that supports
Carrie's diagnosis and substantiates her sterilization, but question
those "forces and relations" that constitute the archive, "those conditions for existence" that create Carrie as a limit figure of"threat'' to
the well-being of society and, thus, the figure that holds together the
epistemology of the "universal," "the normal," the not-shiftless, the
not-ignorant-the not-worthless, the not-antisocial class of whites. 54
48. See LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 1fr-35; see also COHEN,
supra note 45.
49. COHEN, supra note 45, at 2, 194; LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46,
at 134.
50. LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 134.
51. See Reddy, supra note 36, at 29.
52. ld.
53. See MAROUF HAsiAN, JR., THE RHETORIC OF EUGENICS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
THOUGHT 72-73, 86-88 (Univ. of Georgia Press 20 17), for a discussion ofAmerican feminist interpretations and selective appropriation of eugenics.
54. COHEN, supra note 45, at 2, 194; LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46,
at 134.
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This process is complex, however, since it must also account for the
erasure of Carrie's subjectivity from the archive without ignoring
her objectification as a historical presence that gives meaning to the
nature of personhood and citizenship. 65 This retracing also means
retracing the regulatory ideals of liberal, white feminism as one of
the conditions that make this archive possible. 56
Thus, the projects discussed here all recover Carrie's story as a
feminist story, as part of a process of reimagining intersectional
feminist approaches to the body, delinking feminism from the enterprises of contemporary neoeugenics that oppress poor and/or women
of color under the sign of"universality." 57 These projects align themselves with Carrie and with an alternative history of feminism that
lends itself to a transformative politics of reproductive justice. Creating a web of meanings that suggest new ways of thinking about how
the reparative claims of victims are recognized by the state and in
public policy as well as theorizing the frames through which reproductive justice should be debated.
The history of feminist arguments for reproductive justice
cannot be understood without a recovery of the premises that violate
the bodily integrity and autonomy of Carrie Buck as well as the
premises that defined her as unfit for reproduction and parenting. 58
As Alexandra Minna Stern argues, "when the reproductive and
erotic body is highlighted, an uninterrupted line can be drawn from
the sterilization laws passed by state legislatures in the 1910s that
targeted 'morons' and the 'feebleminded' to the sexual surgeries performed by federal agencies on poor female welfare recipients during
the 1960s."59 This "uninterrupted line" appropriates the premises of
the archive for the future rather than challenge those premises. 60
The feminist anti-archive disrupts that line and redirects our attention to other frameworks of understanding.
Queer, disabled artist Eli Clare titles their piece ''Yearning
Toward Carrie Buck." 61 This "yearning'' toward Carrie as an omission
in the feminist archives speaks a desire for feminist reparations that
55. See Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, NAT. HIST. MAG., July 1984, at
5-6.
56. Cf. Alexandra Minna Stern, STERIUZED In The Name of Public Health: Race,
Immigration, and Reproductive Control in Modern California, 95 AM. J. PuBLIC HEALTH
1128, 1134 (2005).
57. HAsiAN, supra note 53, at 87.
58. See id. at 73-74.
59. ALExANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS OF BETTER
BREEDING IN MODERN AMERICA 7 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2015).
60. Seeid.
61. Eli Clare, Yearning Toward Carrie Buck, 8 J . LIT. & CULTURAL DISABILITY STUD.
335-344 (2014).
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go beyond the meager apologies some governors have made to the
victims of eugenic sterilization in their states.62 Clare seeks the voice
and the feelings that the archive has repressed, but they also seek
to recognize Carrie's silence as part of the archive's necessary conditions.63 Clare imagines a future solidarity that does not erase feminism's absence/presence in the eugenic archive. In place of Carrie's
voice, Clare imagines Carrie's body as the archive's suppressed text,
its domination a condition of the archival record: "I can almost see
the word imbecile etched on your belly, each letter a thin line of scar.
Trapped, hounded, desperate-you were released only after John
Bell cut into you on October 19, 1927. The body as gut and bowel, hope
and dread, literal trash."64 Carrie's body is not only trash, disposable,
but a blank space made legible only through the linked archives of
surgical and legal documentation, a record of her own debasement
which is "instrumentalized in the service of the regulation of difference."65 Carrie is not citizen, but a placeholder of a population: "Have
the historians forgotten? There'd be no story without Carrie's body.
The body as gristle and synapse, water and bone, pure empty space,
the body as legal precedent." 66 But Carrie's body is mathematical as
well-quantitative and generative; pseudo-statistics estimate her
normality, three generations the limits of the court's recognition of
her rights, zero the number of times feminists expressed solidarity
with Carrie in 1927.
Clare addresses Carrie through identification with the ableist
narration of Carrie's story by historians and feminists. 67 Clare tells
Carrie, "recent historians seem to think the court case and your
sterilization might have been less a travesty ifyou had been intellectually disabled. They want to believe in real imbeciles. I, diagnosed
mentally retarded in 1966, imagine, yearn, stretch toward you,
judged feebleminded in 1924."68 Clare's investigation of the archives,
like the investigation of historians, shows that Carrie's labeling has
less to do with mental ability and is instead a fabrication of the
patriarchy: raped and blamed and revictimized, the archive connects
62. See William Branigin, Va. Apologizes to the Vr.ctims of Sterilization, WASH. POST
(May 3, 2002), https://www .washingtonpost.com/archive/loca.l/2002/05/03/va-apologizes
-to-the-victims-of-sterilizations/9cbfe2ad-950c-4 7f8-a186-c68e4dle362e/?noredirect
=on&utmterm=.e6140388d823 [https://perma.cc!HA6W-78YA]; see also Clare, supra note
61, at 335, 342.
63. See Clare, supra note 61, at 337.
64. ld. at 338.
65. Reddy, supra note 36, at 29.
66. Clare, supra note 61, at 336.
67. See id. at 341--42.
68. ld. at 342.
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sexuality and gender identity to mental and moral capacities, refusing women autonomy and bodily integrity.69 But why, asks Clare, is
it important to proclaim Emma, Carrie, and Vivian as not-imbeciles? 70
What would have been justified if they were found to have intellectual disabilities? In thinking about the limit embodied in Carrie for
the feminist archive, Clare asks: when we strike down the facts of
the archives, in our zeal do we leave intact its premises?71
Similar questions haunt Rory Dawn, the child narrator ofTupelo
Hassman's novel Girlchild. 72 Rory Dawn wants to understand Carrie
Buck's experience as non-mother in the social worker archive,
stripped of her right to mother Vivian. 73 The novel begins with Rory
telling readers about her own mother's missing teeth; the gap was
always there to remind her mother of who she was, keeping her from
ever feeling comfortable laughing: "[i]t's the same with being feebleminded. No matter how smart you might appear to be later with
your set of diplomas on their fine white parchment, the mistakes
you made before the real lessons sunk in never fade." 74 Rory steals
the social worker file on her mother and resists its degraded labeling of her mother, and when a man in their trailer park begins
sexually abusing her, she befriends a possibly imaginary girl named
Vivian Buck. 75 When Vivian disappears, Rory rediscovers her in the
pages of a library book and decides to write a report on Carrie Buck's
case: "Mama was right. I did find her again, and after spending all
this time alone, finding my best friend right there on page 237 feels
like an exclamation point in my heart."76 Rory begins to see herself as
a "feeble-minded daughter of a feeble-minded daughter'' in the outlines of Viv's story: "[t]he thinking on [Justice] Holmes's part was
that if members of the white race behaved in undesirable ways, these
behaviors would creep into the upper classes like weeds, root down
deep, and put the choke on the delicate hybrids growing up around
them." 77 Hassman emphasizes the racialized class dimensions of
Carrie's story, demonstrating the threat to the white supremacist
state that poor white women's unregulated sexuality represents. 78
69. See id. at 33f)....42.
70. Id. at 341.
71. See id. (discussing these questions about disability rights, sexuality, and class); see
also Michelle Oberman, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Buck v. Bell: Thoughts Occasioned
by Paul Lombardo's Three Generations, No Imbeciles, 59 J. LEGAL Enuc. 357, 388 (2010).
72. TuPEW HAsSMAN, GIRLCHILD 182 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2012).
73. ld. at 182.
74. ld. at 3--4.
75. See generally id.
76. Id. at 171.
77. ld. at 174.
78. HAsSMAN, supra note 72, at 172--73.
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At the end of the novel, after her mother is killed drunkenly
trying to cross a street with no crosswalk and no signal, Rory Dawn
commits her story to the anti-archive by burning down their trailer
and taking off for parts unknown: "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's
flag flies in triumph for Roe and Brown but it still hangs at halfmast in the case of Buck v. [sic] and I can't let that stand. I may not
have been born captain of this boat, but I was born to rock it."79 Rory
refuses state care because in writing her C-essay about Buck v. Bell,
she comes to understand the denial of personhood is committed
against Vivian as well as Carrie:
Viv and I share this history. These are our mothers and the
beliefs that touch us and the words that judge us and like the
entries in the encyclopedia, there's no keeping just the good parts
and separating the rest. Mothers and grandmothers might align
Viv and me but the Man does the rest. We're like shoes tied tight
together and thrown over electrical wire; every pulse going
through that wire goes right through us. 80

Rory Dawn replaces the social worker's estimate of her mother and
in so doing reminds us that Carrie was a mother, that Vivian was
taken away from her as a newborn and delivered back to the same
foster family in which Carrie was raped, fulfilling the closed circular
logic of eugenic ideology. 81
Both authors approach Buck not only from the perspective of
reproductive autonomy as an adult woman facing state violence, but
that of a girl child stigmatized by a system that tracks her into channels of adult failure. 82 The meaning of Buck for contemporary reproductive justice is also a record of institutional violence against the
female body, as rape is institutionalized as the girl child's deviance.83
This institutionalization of violence is enacted in the archive that records domination as poor women's sexual and reproductive deviance-the family, the school, the state institution, and the courts deny Carrie
her parental rights in incorporating her daughter back into the
same family that victimized her. 84 The archive records no resistance
on the part of social workers to Carrie's institutionalization, her
sterilization, or the denial of her parental rights.85
79. ld. at 176.
80. Id. at 182--83 (emphasis added).
81. Seeid.
82. See gen-erally id.
83. See Jess Whatcott, Sexual Deviance and 'Mental Defectiveness" in Eugenics Era
California, NOTCHES (Mar.14, 2017), http:l/notchesblog.com/2017/03/14/sexual-deviance
-and-mental-defectiveness-in-eugenics-era-california [https://perma.cc/G237-RYEM].
84. See Gould, supra note 55 (emphasis added).
85. ld.
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This focus on the social worker file demonstrates a link between
the "unfit" and the feminized role of the social worker in protecting
the interests of the state. 86 In 2014, NYU's Asian/PacifirJAmerican
Institute produced a series of performances as part of its exhibit
titled ''Haunted Files: the Eugenics Record Office," an immersive recreation of the Long Island eugenics archives. 87 In one piece ''Unheard
Voices," a creative resignification of the archives occurs through the
juxtaposition of the records88 of the social worker and Smith alum
Margaret Andrews, and the voice of her "unfit" biracial "client" Hazel
Whiteman, reversing the powerful function of the state and placing
the power of perspective in the audience's ears. 89 Like Carrie, Hazel
is taken in by a foster family that puts her to work and is raped by
her foster father, ending up pregnant and "immoral."90 The social
worker tells the audience that she has been ''bred to be caring'' and
is genetically predisposed to "compassion," but she has Hazel's baby
taken away at birth, stating, "too heavy to lift" but "too useful to
throw away." 91
This web of interpretation connects Carrie and Hazel demonstrating the state's linking of "unfitness" to its investment in exploiting poor girls' labor. 92 The categorization of Carrie and Hazel's
placement as "care" is shown to be a systemic investment in providing the domestic labor ofpoor girls to middle-class families. 93 In fact,
what makes Carrie's case different from previous cases brought
before the courts is that her sterilization was placed within the
framework of deinstitutionalization---once sterilized the "feebleminded" could be paroled and trained to do menial work; like Hazel,
Carrie was expected and did return to the domestic work that she
had been doing before her institutionalization.94 Dr. Priddy argued
at Carrie's hearing that she "could be released and earn a living as
a housekeeper. Because the 'demand for domestics in housework is
so great,' probably 'half of our young women of average intelligence'
86. Id.
87. Haunted Files: The Eugenics Record Office, Unheard Voices: Haunted Files
Special Performance, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22, 2015), https:/lwww.youtube.com/watch?v=TOw
lapAQjS8 [https://perma.cc/G38R-VBZ9] [hereinafter Haunted Files].
88. See generally Petra Kuppers, Identity Politics ofMobility: Kara Walker and Berni
Searle, 5.1 PERFORMANCE PARADIGM (May 2009).
89. Haunted Files, supra note 87.
90. ld.
91. ld.
92. ld.
93. Compare LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 132, with Haunted
Files, supra note 87.
94. LoMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 132.
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could be placed in jobs, but that practice was discontinued because
of the 'constant chance of them becoming mothers,' he said."95
Hazel's record is found in an archive separate from Carrie's. 96
The same year that Virginia passed its model sterilization law it
passed its law prohibiting interracial marriage. 97 In 1925, a Virginia
eugenicist ranted, "[n]ot a few white women are giving birth to mulatto children. These women are usually feebleminded, but in some
cases they are simply depraved. The segregation or sterilization of
feebleminded females is the only solution to the problem." 98 Clare,
in their work, approaches the archives again, searching for the
records of forced sterilization for Virginia's residents of color from
the 1920s, writing, "I need to ask: in what ways did Carrie's whiteness protect her?"99 As Rory Dawn recognizes, Carrie's body is an
instrument of normative whiteness, a case put forth specifically from
the white asylum to reduce the number of interracial children born
to white women. 100 Clare presses against the limits of the archives'
segregationist orderings to ask about its omissions (what is not in
these records of the white asylum, showing us how archives lie). If
Carrie emerges as a historical test case, thousands disappear into
the geography of institutional hierarchy and racist oppression.
Carrie embodies segregationist obsessions with racial purity and
her records become its expression of the concern with establishing
white normativity through control of poor white women's sexuality.
The reclaiming of Carrie is the claiming of kin, not through genetic
records of the archive, but in the recognition of the archives categorization, its obsession with the scientific recording of race, of mental
ability, moral capacities, as a compulsion of classification in the
service of legitimating the structure of its own making-and in the
process, creating difference as hierarchy, as value.
In a piece that resembles Clare's ''yearning'' toward Carrie, Cara
Page performs "A Poet Psalm for the Mismeasured," for those who
became the ''brick and mortar'' for scientific genocide, declaring "we
reclaim you these discarded bodies" and "we release you from your
95. Id.
96. See generally Haunted Files, supra note 87.
97. Lutz Kaelber, Virginia, EUGENICS: COMPULSORY STERILIZATION IN 50 AMERICAN
STATES, https:/lwww. uvm.edul-lkaelber/eugenics/VANAhtml [https://perma.cc/WKT4
-82WX].
98. Clare, supra note 61, at 340.
99. ld. at 339.
100. See Genevieve Carlton, Virginia Ran a Secret Eugenics Program That Didn't End
Until1979, MEDIUM (Apr. 18 2018), https://medium.oom/@ed.itors91459/virginia-ran-a
-secret-eugenics-program-that-didnt-end-until-1979-e9fubfd23c64 [https://perma.cc/3PCM

-HZWN].
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cages and outrage." 101 Page and Clare build an anti-archive by raising
the dead from its files, in a fashion that somewhat eerily resembles
Rory Dawn's surrection of an invisible friend, Vivian, to help her
survive the abuse she suffers. Clare brings her address to Carrie to
a close by addressing herself to contemporary feminists, stating:
[b]eyond the histories, I imagine a congress of sterilized women
and men-raging, fierce, grief filled. Puerto Rican women sit with
Appalachian men. First Nations teenagers sit with self-described
mad women. Disabled folks who have lived their entire lives locked
away in state-run hospitals sit with southern Black women who
know all too well the words Mississippi appendectomy, the meaning behind them. Women of color ordered by judges or paid to
take Norplant sit with women tricked into signing tubal ligation
consent forms. They won't be asking for apologies nor giving
absolution, but rather holding remembrance, demanding reparation, planning revolution. 102

Clare's ending points us toward a future that imagines reproductive
justice out of the revolutionary demands of communities in coalition,
that recognizes sterilization as a collective harm to communities as
well as a violation of bodily integrity and personhood of those already
made vulnerable by a racist patriarchal state.103 This vision recognizes
difference and signifies coalition in the struggle for reparations.
This vision is very different from what has occurred and is occurring in states such as North Carolina and Virginia which have gone
through legislative processes to provide compensation for victims. 104
First of all, in North Carolina, the term "reparation" was purposely
dismissed as opening a door to discussions of reparations for slavery, signaling the state legislature's and the Governor's task force's
desires to limit the scope of historical and political discussion. 105 The
framework brought to bear on these processes is neither victimcentered nor informed by principles of reproductive justice as outlined by Ross and Solinger. 106 In other words, as Ordover argues, the
101. Haunted Files: the Eugenics Record Office, Cara Page: A Poet Psalm for the Mismeasured, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22, 2015), https:/fwww.youtube.com/watch?v=o2Z1dCPCLsk
[https:/lperma.cc/VJ5L-Y8CH].
102. Clare, supra note 61, at 343.
103. Seeid.
104. See Final Report to the Governor ofthe State of North Carolina, GoVERNOR'S TASK
FORCE TO DETERMINE THE METHOD OF COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF N.C.'S EUGENICS

BOARD (Jan. 27, 2012), https://files.nc.gov/ncdoa/JSV/FinalReport-GovernorsEugenics
CompensationTaskForce.pdf [hereinafter Final Report].
105. Brightman et al., supra note 1, at 4 74-93.
106. Id.; see also Final Report, supra note 104 (containing the minutes of each meeting,
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processes of apology and compensation are for an event that happened in the past, "mistakes'' that must be recognized, so that we
can learn and they never happen again, despite the evidence that
such injustices continue and that eugenic logics clearly emerge as
the logic behind other U.S. public policies of reproductive and economic rights. 107
One of the reasons that North Carolina and Virginia have made
so few "compensation[s]" to victims is because of states' requirements that victims produce documentation of their sterilization
without consent by the state-and that it be by the state and not a
county health department. 108 Claims of reparative justice cannot be
made using the documents of local archives although North
Carolina has asked for documentation of those who suffered coerced
sterilization. 109 That archive will document the state's denial of
reparations based on the lack of archival documentation. 110
Furthermore, the victim testimony recorded in the public hearings of the North Carolina Governor's task force often shares the same
language as the archive. 111 Again and again, victims discuss their
fitness for parenthood or their sterilized parent's work ethic, parenting
skills, or intelligence. 112 The one meeting in which the victims were
allowed to tell their stories without interruption is a record of the
state's devaluation of the lives of its most vulnerable citizens, but it
is also a hearing very much geared to have victims repeat statements of societal "worthiness" that sometimes condemn the indifference and cruelty of the state, but often work not counter to the
premises of eugenics but within its binary framing of fit/unfit. 113
My purpose is not to criticize the victims' stories, but to suggest
that little effort has been made to engage in collective consciousness
including comments from victims who support a more thorough public ongoing discussion of how eugenic sterilization was linked to white supremacy, poverty, and reproductive rights).
107. See ORDOVER, supra note 19, at 201.
108. See Final Report, supra note 104, at B-5, B-6. There is evidence that many people
were sterilized under the stamp of "eugenics" by county and town officials and doctors,
but Virginia and North Carolina do not see the state as responsible for compensation.
Id. Also, the state has not involved any of the corporations or organizations that funded
eugenic sterilization in the process; victims themselves noted that these organizations
should be a part of the reparative process and provide monetary compensation. I d.
109. Eric Mennel, Payments Start for N.C. Eugenics Victims, but Many Won't Qualify,
NPR (Oct. 31,2014, 5:04PM), https:/lwww.npr.org/sectionslhealth-shots/2014/10/31/36
0355784/payments-start-for-n-c-eugenics-victims-but-many-wont-qualify [https://perma
.cc/K2YB-ZVK5].

110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
See Final Report, supra note 104, at D-7.
Seeid.
Seeid.
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raising with the communities harmed by these practices, which might
have allowed for more victims to come forward. 114 Overwhelmingly,
what emerges in these stories is the stigma associated with eugenic
sterilization, and the state's lack of concern to have victims, their
families, and communities participate in a more transformative collective restorative justice project. 115 The state has designed the process so that the North Carolina Governor's task force represents the
victims when reproductive justice activists might have been engaged
to work with the communities and groups most affected by reproductive oppression-which would have also been those communities
most oppressed by the state as well. 116
Moreover, Nancy Ordover argues that eugenic practices in care
for those with physical and cognitive disabilities, and how disability
is socially defined, have been mostly absent from discussion:
[f]rom the passage of the earliest sterilization statutes, warnings
have been issued on the repercussions of eugenicists' assaults on
the "feeble-minded." Eugenics opponents noted that women and
people of color were frequently and erroneously so designated,
and cautioned that endorsements of compulsory sterilization of
the disabled would lead to an ever-widening circle of candidates
among other reviled groups. Ironically, while physically and developmentally disabled women have historically been among the
most prone to eugenic attack, their precarious position has rarely
been viewed as anything other than an alarm, a call to safeguard
the rights of [the] nondisabled, though otherwise marginalized,
individuals and groups. 117

Similarly, Johanna Schoen, whose turning over of the eugenic files
to journalists eventually resulted in this compensation process,
argues that intersectional reproductive justice frameworks have
been mostly ignored. 118 Schoen believes this is because the dominant
114. Elaine Riddick is one of the survivors of eugenic sterilization who articulates a
reproductive justice framework in her claims against the state. Associated Press, Woman
Fights for Compensation for Forced Sterilization, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Aug. 5, 2011, 9:27
AM), http://www.jackaonville.com/article/20110815/NEWS/801246149 [https:/lperma.cc
/5DPK-TCUU]. She originally sued the North Carolina Eugenics Board as part of the
Women's Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) class-action suit
in 1974 and lost. ld. See generally SHATEMA 'I'HREADCRAFI', INTIMATE JUSTICE: THE BLACK
FEMALE BODY AND THE BODY POLITIC (Oxford Univ. Press 2016).
115. See Final Report, supra note 104.
116. See N.C. Exec. Order No. 83 (July 1, 2012), http:lldigital.ncdcr.gov/cdm/ref/collec
tionlp 16062coll5/id/12148 [https://perma.cci8CJ9-GJT2].
117. ORDOVER, supra note 19, at 195 (footnote omitted).
118. See generally JOHANNA SCHOEN, CHOICE AND COERCION: BIRTH CONTROL, STERILIZATION, AND ABORTION IN PuBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 247 (Univ. N.C. 2005).
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paradigm of women's sexuality and motherhood is embedded in
eugenic logics:
Women's reproductive rights ... and particularly the reproductive rights of welfare recipients, remain a contested issue. In
fact, I would suggest that the public discussion ... centered on
race at the expense of reproductive rights because a great many
people in this country continue to believe that women should not
have children while they are receiving public assistance. 119

An intersectional approach would not separate discussions of race
and reproductive justice, particularly in discussions of welfare rights
and motherhood because, historically, racist stereotypes of black
women have been used to defund programs such as Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid. 120 These racist
stereotypes are at the root of support for such programs as workfare,
child caps, and time-limits in the receipt ofTANF benefits, passed
as part of the bipartisan Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 121
Theses compensation processes offer no transformative thinking
about the relation between the archives and contemporary structures of oppression that might be used to put in place the economic
structures, public policies (including the healthcare system), and
social safety structures that reproductive justice requires. 122 Nor
does the process seek to place eugenic sterilization within a reproductive justice framework that would connect it to contemporary
issue such as the criminalization of pregnancy, discrimination against
pregnant women, and currently, the separation and detention of
minors from their refugee parents and the ability to lie to women
seeking abortions, which are all reproductive justice issues. 123
The "single-issue" platform of abortion negates the ways that
eugenic logics, patriarchal dominance, and white supremacy continue
to define processes ofpublic policy making and how little mainstream
liberal attention is given to issues that do not fit within the white
liberal feminist definition of a reproductive rights issues (i.e., birth
control, abortion). 124 Loretta Ross and Rickie Solinger provide one
example of how such limited thinking results in an essentializing of
119. ld.
120. See JAEL SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDMDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 9, 162 (South End Press 2d ed. 2016).
121. ld. at 162.
122. Seeid.
123. I d. at 9 .
124. See id. at 5.

152

WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.

[Vol. 25:131

gender and is detrimental to the bodily autonomy and integrity of
women of color. 125 In 2011, in Mississippi, pro-choice activists financed a successful campaign to defeat a "personhood" initiative on
the ballot, but did not give equal funding and education to linking
this issue to an initiative to further restrict voting rights in the state,
and the initiative passed:
African American women working in Mississippi and throughout
the South were profoundly disappointed that some mainstream
feminists failed to understand the intersection between women's
rights and voting rights. This failure demonstrated how singleissue feminism could be used to perpetuate white supremacy
and thwart human rights, even in the twenty-first century.126

Equally important, in ignoring how eugenic sterilization of
Black women is part of ongoing attempts to control and regulate
their sexual and bodily integrity and ability to mother, these processes ignore the origins of eugenic logics in the enslavement of
Black people and the genocide of indigenous peoples:
[S]lave women's wombs to sustain the system of slavery provided
an early model of reproductive control. "Eugenic ideas were perfectly suited to the ideological needs of the young monopoly capitalists," Angela Davis points out, as their "[i]mperialist incursions
in Latin America and in the Pacific needed to be justified, as did
the intensified exploitation of Black workers in the South and
immigrant workers in the North and West." It is no wonder that
the movement was financed by the nation's wealthiest capitalists,
including the Carnegie, Harriman, and Kellogg dynasties ....
[a]lthough eugenic policies were directed primarily at whites,
they grew out of racist ideology. 127

II. CHRONIC HARM: REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND THE
EXPLOITATION OF CARE LABOR

In this final section, I consider another case that seems to be
illuminated from an intersectional reproductive justice approach to
125. See Ross & SOLINGER, supra note 20, at 117.
126. See id. at 114 (citation omitted); see also Tanya Ann Kennedy, Feminist Ideology
and the U.S. Supreme Court: A New Era? Speech at the National Women's Studies Ass'n
Annual Convention (Nov. 2014) (offering another argument that links reproductive
justice and Harris u. Quinn to the voting rights act. After 2016, intersectional feminist
education on voting suppression and white supremacy as feminist issues has been occurring more frequently).
127. RoBERTS, supra note 46, at 61.
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the archives, the Supreme Court case Harris v. Quinn. 128 In that case,
Pamela Harris, the caregiver for her disabled son, received a Medicaid
subsidy from the state so that she could take care of him in her
home. 129 However, Harris objected to paying union dues to the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU), which represented health
care workers in Illinois who were paid by the state to act as personal
attendants in the home. 130 Although Harris was not required to join
the union, she was required to pay union dues, according to the "fair
share" law designed to prevent workers from accepting the benefits
of the union's collective bargaining without contributing to its financial support. 131 The Supreme Court decided that the state was
only a "partial" employer and that the true employer was the client
with a disability. 132 The Court further concluded that caregivers
supported by Medicaid funds could not be compelled to pay union
dues because the client was the "true" employer. 133
As a jointly authored piece in The Nation pointed out, the
majority opinion threatened state employee unionism but was also
aligned with a racist patriarchal tradition of excluding care work
from labor protections:
[the majority opinion in] Harris is an extension of a different
tradition in American labor law, the denial ofrights to workers
in industries dominated by female and non-white workers. Far
from universal, the major New Deal labor laws-the National
Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Act--explicitly excluded particular occupations, including farm work and domestic labor, which had large numbers of
128. See generally Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014). This ruling has now
been effectively replaced by Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) in
which the majority ruled that "[t]he state of Illinois' extraction of agency fees from
nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment; Abood v. Detroit
Bd. ofEd., which concluded otherwise, is overruled." Janus v. American Fed'n of State, Cty.
&Mun. Emps., Council31, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/casesljanus
-v-american-federation-state-county-municipal-employees-council-31 [https://perma.cc
/QV7X-GNFM].
129. Sam Baker & Emma Roller, The Supreme Court Just Dealt a Devastating Blow
to Public Unions, ATLANTIC (June 30, 20 14), https:l/www.theatlantic.comlpolitics/archive
/20 14/06/the-supreme -court-just-dealt-a-devastating-blow-to-public-unions/44092 5
[https:/lperma.cciSP59-CELU].
130. Supreme Court Asked to Hear Case Seeking Return of Union Fees, NAT'L RIGHT
WoRK LEGAL FOUND. (May 21, 2018), https://nrtw.org/news/riffey-cert-05212018/ [https:/1
perma.cc18QLL-GT8A]. Several caregivers joined this lawsuit with Harris as the lead
petitioner, and thus, the "face" of the lawsuit. The National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation funded the lawsuit. Id.
131. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2014).
132. See id. at 2638.
133. See id. at 2634-38.
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female, African-American and Mexican-American workers. While
some racially and sexually biased exclusions were later eliminated, Harris effectively extends this history ofdiscrimination. 134

In direct contrast to the undervaluation of this labor, Justice Kagan
argued in her Hanis dissent that "[s]uch a ruling subverts the state's
determination of these labors as being of the utmost public interest."135 Kagan's emphasis on the connection between quality of care,
and wages and benefits challenges the Court's attempt to devalue
in-home-care work. 136 Because of collective bargaining, Kagan argues
home-care assistants have nearly doubled their wages in less than
10 years, obtained state-funded health insurance, and benefited
from better training and workplace safety measures. . . . The
State, in return ... believes it has gotten a more stable workforce
providing higher quality care, thereby avoiding the costs associated with institutionalization [of home care clients]. 187

The case of Harris raises significant questions about the organizing models of poor workers' unions. 138 The incorporation of home
health care attendants into the SEIU was the result of a decades
long struggle to organize workers who had previously been excluded
from traditional unions and the most important national labor laws
of the twentieth century. 139 These early organizations developed out
of worker centers and community organizations such as the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), as well
as early domestic workers organizing at the local level. 140 Such
organizing had to address what Nancy Fraser has identified as the
"injustices of redistribution, recognition, and representation[.]" 141
134. Eileen Boris et al., After 'Harris v. Quinn': The State of Our Unions, THE NATION
(July 2, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/after-harris-v-quinn-state-our-unions/
[https://perma.cc/33MM-KLBB]; see also Sarah Jaffe, Why Harris and Hobby Lobby Spell
Disaster for Working Women, IN THESE TIMES (June 30, 2014, 5:41P.M.), http://inthese
times.oom/working/entry/16894/sootus_rules_against_female_workers [https://perma.cc
/X8DF-TBZF] (pointing out that 90% of home healthcare workers [are] women and "most
of them are poor, immigrants, and of color."). Additionally, in Harris, Alito has "create [d] [-and exempted-] the special designation of 'partial public employee.' " I d.
135. Boris et al., supra note 134.
136. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2648 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (citations omitted).
138. See Boris et al., supra note 134.
139. See SEIU Healthcare, Home Care, http://www.seiuhcilin.org/categorylhome-care
[https://perm.a.cciH44R-Y26D].
140. Eileen Boris & Premilla Nadasen, Domestic Workers Organize!, 11 J. LAB. & Soc'Y
413, 415 (2008), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.oomldoi/pdf/10.1111/j.1743-4580.2008.00217.x.
141. ORGANIZING WOMEN WORKERS IN THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: BEYOND THE WEAPONS
OF THE WEAK 7 (Naila Kabeer, Ratna Sudarshan & Kristy Milward eds., Zed Books Ltd.
2013).
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Poor workers and their allies have approached worker organizing
through community and social justice movement models that implicitly reject the limited structures of traditional unionism that has, as
Susan Porter Benson argues, "devoted most of its energy to enhancing the privileges of a constituency that was already in a position of
privilege because of its race and gender."142 Vanessa Tait argues
that these unions "usually begin their organizing in the community,
taking on multiple issues outside the usual scope of representation,
such as affordable housing, health care, childcare, racial and gender
discrimination, and police brutality." 143 According to Tait, "[these]
unions offer a different vision of what the labor movement can be:
activist based, inventive, adventurous, and infused with ideals of
social justice and equality." 144
This struggle for worker rights including the right to collective
bargaining has been centrally about the "rights of poor women as
both clients of and workers for the welfare state." 145 This fight led
ultimately to health care workers incorporation into the SEIU after
decades of struggle, seen as a hard-won revival of unionism due in
part to SEilYs work to reach out to workers previously excluded
from unions. 146 For example, Bruce Nissen argues that SEilYs social
movement orientation accounted for its success in organizing
Florida nursing home workers. 147
However, Eileen Boris and Jennifer Klein argue that the ruling
in Harris shows that these two models of worker organizing may have
reached an impasse. 148 Boris and Klein raise this question at the end
of Caring for America and in their update in Feminist Studies, written
as a response to Harris: can the centralizing, top-down, growth-driven
model of SEIU address the specific needs of care workers as well as
the more activist and client centered approach that has defined
Domestic Workers United? Home-care workers and domestic workers have built their organizations through such client-worker care
organizations as Caring Across Generations and in coalition with
other community organizations. 149
142. VANESSA TAIT, POOR WORKERS' UNIONS: REBillLDING LABOR FROM BELOW 15
(South End Press, 2005).
143. Id. at 12.
144. I d. at 2 .
145. EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS
IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE, 151 (2012) [hereinafter BORIS & KLEIN, CARING
FOR AMERICA].
146. See Bruce Nissen, A Different Kind of Union: SEIU Healthcare Florida from the
Mid-1990s through 2009, in LIFE AND LABOR IN THE NEW NEW SOUTH 289, 301 (Robert
H. Zieger ed., Univ. Press of Fl. 2012).
147. Id. at 308.
148. See Boris et al., supra note 134.
149. BORIS & KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERlCA, supra note 145, at 151-52.
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Further questions are raised for feminist organizers and workers' rights advocates by the patriarchal framing of Harris. 150 What
are the limits for incorporating home-care workers into public sector
unions when the union includes those who are privileged by the
white patriarchal framing of laws that ensure their status as "unpaid" caregivers, while negating the absent structuring of the welfare state in making that status possible?151 This is the subtext of
Harris's complaint and Alita's opinion in Harris. 152
While most histories of the case document it as part of a larger
orchestrated attack on public sector unionism, it is also a strategic
move to resist organizers' attempts to bring together care and labor,
to bringing home and work together in a way that frames low-income and no-income women's role as caregivers as central to the
state. If we return to the archives that focus on the exploitive use of
the "feeble-minded" as domestic workers, then we see the relationship between eugenic sterilization and the logics of the majority in
Harris: of utmost interest is the lesser cost to the state through
exploitation of women's labor, even if it leaves those who do paid
care work in poverty and without the ability to exercise the kind of
ccideal motherhood" represented by Pamela Harris. 163
Alita argues that the compelling interest of the state is in
providing home-care attendants ccto prevent the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals who may instead be satisfactorily maintained at home at a lesser cost to the State." 154 In this representation
ofhome care, the rights of the disabled are not mentioned; instead the
interests of the state are solely imagined in terms of cost benefit and
Harris's willingness to align her interests as caregiver with the interests of the state. 155 However, as Boris and Klein point out, most workfare placements for recipients of Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families udesignated home care, like home-based child care, an
appropriate workfare placement only if performed for individuals
other than family ."156 Thus, the split between care and work is implicit
in the treatment of mothers based on their social class, because
mothers ofchildren with disabilities are considered deserving of a subsidy to prevent the institutionalized care of their loved ones and
mothers receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families are not.
Nor are most working mothers able to provide even temporary
care by taking leave time from work. For example, Alita's protection
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014).
See generally id.
Seeid.
See id. at 2623.
See id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 2645.
BORIS & KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA, supra note 145, at 118.
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of the relationship of mother and son in Harris is in stark contrast
to my student who was threatened with the loss ofTANF benefits.
This happened because daycare enrollment occurred in August while
my student did not begin classes until after Labor Day. She was
forced to "volunteer'' for a month at a local nonprofit. Workfare measures such as this have actually been the impetus, historically, for
social justice movements. 157 As Vanessa Tait and Premilla Nadasen
have documented, the National Welfare Rights Organization had, in
the late 1960s and early 1970s developed a coalition model of"welfare recipients and the working poor, including low-wage workers,
rank-and-file union caucus members, domestic workers, and the unemployed."158 Since the earliest workfare schemes, workfare activists
and low-wage union workers and public sector workers had worked
together to avoid being pit against each other, "redefin[ing] welfare
in terms of economic justice-the right to a decent job [of] livable
wages-as well as the continued political fight for state support of
caregiving activities in the home." 159
This simultaneous focus on economic justice and social citizenship as caregivers recognizes the need to resist on two fronts the
racist and classist frames that guide U.S. public policy and that
protect and subsidize Pamela Harris's care for her son because it is
in the "public interest," whereas excluding poor women's caregiving
from collective bargaining-and, thus, denying that the state receives
any benefit from their care labor. 160 Shatema Threadcraft argues
that these policies are a form of gendered racist oppression that
extract Black women's care as a resource and exploit it for the labor
ofwhite families:
[t]ake the capability of Life. Life does not simply appear into the
world. It must be reproduced and sustained. Whites have long
been advantaged relative to blacks in their efforts to reproduceand therefore advantaged in coming into being. They have also
been advantaged in their efforts to keep the body alive. And, ifproducing and keeping the body itself alive forms a major part of
"so-called" women's work'' [sic] the body politic has helped white
women a great deal in their efforts while at the very least neglecting black women in their efforts to do the same. Whites have
157. TAIT, supra note 142, at 77.
158. Out of this coalition came ACORN and the Movement for Economic Justice--at
their roots, the movements developed by poor women of color to bring together the
interests of those excluded from the labor and family laws that protect middle-class
workers, offering some semblance of economic security and protection from exploitation.
See id.; see generally PREM:ILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Routledge 2004).
159. TAIT, supra note 142, at 179 (citation omitted).
160. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2634-38 (2014).
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hoarded support for bringing life into being and they have done
so in a racialized social context where black women were far more
likely to suffer disabling reproductive intervention. Whites have
therefore hoarded opportunities to produce healthy infants. 161

This hierarchy of "hoarding opportunities" is the case in the
Family Medical Leave Act as well. 162 Policies such as FMLA make
clear that some members of the state are imagined as not being part
of a care network that is integral to social citizenship-in which
they will expect to care for others and be cared for themselves at
some point in their lives-whereas others are imagined as full citizens precisely through their ability to access FMLA as a benefit of
economic and gendered privilege. 163
Current economic and family policies perpetuate and exploit
existing class and race inequalities among women to disenfranchise
the majority of poor white and Black and Latina workers from accessing basic care for themselves, whereas at the same time symbolically
excluding them from the personhood implied in the entitlement to
care and economic security. The Supreme Court's decision reaffirms
a system of racist and classist oppression for most women by treating
these policies as gender neutral and by arguing that these are cases
of"love and care" and not a means of emotional exploitation ofwomen
in service of the state and capital. 164 At the same time, the laws produce as an effect the image of Pamela Harris to represent the public
face of caregiving as one that insists on its private, apolitical nature.
In all these cases, Pamela Harris, the student in my class, the
imagined worker who takes leave, it is women who are the representative worker, but whose status is defined by the state in relational
terms-according to the abilities of the child, according to her relation to the employer; Harris is rewarded for her marital status, her
class status, and her symbolic representation of "ideal motherhood"
but only so far as her interests align with the interests of the state
and her work can be defined in relation to her son's disabilityperhaps if institutionalization were cheaper or more convenient for
the state, then Harris, too, might find herself excluded from the
public interest. 165
According to a 2000 U.S. Department of Labor Study, more than
sixty percent of low-wage mothers do not have access to paid leave
161. THREADCRAFT, supra note 114, at 153.
162. See id. at 157.
163. See U.S. DEp'T OF LABOR, Need Time?: The Employee's Guide to the Family and
Medical Leave Act 2 (2015), https:/lwww.dol.gov/whd/fmla/employeeguide.pdf.
164. See Quinn, 134 S. Ct. at 2618.
165. Seeid.

2018]

CHRONIC HARM

159

to take care of a sick child or other family member, but they also do
not have access to other options for care. 166 Whereas more than 77.8%
of workers that make at least $75,000 a year are eligible for FMLA,
less than 39.8% of workers that make less than $35,000 a year are
eligible, and about 73.4% of workers who are in the $35,000 to
$75,000 income bracket are also eligible, according to the U.S. Dept.
of Labor. 167 According to the Feminist Majority Foundation:
[t]he Department of Labor reports that only 11 percent of private sector workers in the United States have access to paid
family leave through their employers. Low-wage workers fare
even worse. Only 5 percent of these workers receive paid leave.
And research from the Center for American Progress indicates
that Black and Latino workers are less likely to be able to access
paid leave, even for the birth or adoption of a new child. 168

Providing a gender-neutral unpaid family leave law, according to
Deborah Anthony,
overlooks the fact that changing the law merely masks those
social stereotypes, assumptions, and expectations of women's
caregiving roles and does not repair the problem. A law that
refuses to take gender into account is effective only if the private
social structure does not itself perpetuate women's inequality,
regardless of what the law says.169

It also does not address systemic racial inequalities that keep Black
and Latina workers in the work force in informal or low-wage work
and more often makes them both caregivers and breadwinners in
the family. 170
In this case, the state makes invisible the racist patriarchal
assumptions of the structure oflabor and public policy, denying that
the state benefits from the care work oflow-income women-indeed,
166. Gaylynn Burroughs, Paid Family Medical Leave Shouldn't be a Luxury
#FAMILYAct, MOMSRISING (Dec. 12, 2013), https:/lwww.momsrising.org/blog/paid-fam
ily-medical-leave-shouldnt-be-a-luxury-familyact [https://perma.cc/9WRP-M3L2].
167. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA): Policy Issues, EvERYCRSREPORT.COM
(Sept. 9, 2018, 1:21PM), https:/lwww.everycrsreport.com/reports/R43214.html#_Toc3660
77861 [https://perma.cc/K33S-m.J6U].
168. Burroughs, supra note 166.
169. Deborah Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act:
Gender-Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER & Soc. POL'y & L. 460, 4 73
(2008) (emphasis omitted).
170. See Challenges with Taking FMLA Leave: Inequalities in A/fordability of FMLA
Leave for Eligible Workers, by Race!Ethnicity, HELLER SCH. Soc. POL'y & MGMT., http://
www. diversitydatakids.orglfiles/Policy/F::MLA/Capacity/Challenges%20with%20taking
%20family%leave.pdf.
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as we learned from the eugenic archives, the state has systemically
exploited that work. 171 Whereas joining the SEIU offers care workers
a means of ensuring access to collective bargaining, it also assimilates
workers to a leadership and organizing model that is traditionally
based on white male leadership, electoral politics, and shop-centered.172 In contrast, Ai-Jen Poo describes how Domestic Workers
United (one of the founding organizations of the National Domestic
Workers Alliance) began in Asian-American community centers as
part of a program that centered on racist and gendered violence. 173
The organizers discovered that much ofthe violence domestic workers
experienced was at the hand of their employers and that much of the
oppression they suffered was structured into their lives as women
of color, as immigrants, and as domestic workers. 174 This organizing
model-which has been more successful than traditional union
organizers would have predicted-shares a similar consciousnessraising model as reproductive justice organizing (protesting in the
street, using worker and community centers based in race-ethnic
affiliation as shop floors), argued for legislation (passing domestic
workers' rights bills in several states), and used a pedagogical framework (Caring Across the Generations and Hand in Hand) which
educates the public, employers, patients, and their families about
care work as labor. 175 It recognizes that economic justice (redistribution) cannot occur without recognition. 176
What Harris makes clear is that while the SEIU can provide
worker security, its model of collective bargaining cannot provide
caregivers with "recognition" or "redistribution" in the sense that
the Supreme Court decision folds care work back into the framework of the family, and refuses to recognize caregivers as being paid
for work, preferring to see the payment as a form of keeping the
ideal family "together." 177 This ideal family can be seen as a strategy
for structuring the care economy as private in two ways that are
detrimental to women and care workers: (1) to privatize the system
of care (or to keep it private in many cases) in the marketplace,
refusing to recognize the state's obligations to the social welfare of
citizens; and (2) to maintain care work in the private family, relying
171. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2618 (2014).
172. See generally id.
173. Ai-Jen Poo & Eric Tang, Domestic Workers Organize in the Global City, in THE
FIRE THIS TIME: ACTIVISM AND THE NEW FEMINISM 150, 163 (Vivien Labaton & Dawn
Lundy Martin eds., 2004).
174. See id. at 164.
175. Id.
176. On redistribution and recognition, see NANCY FRAsER, JUSTICE INTERRUPI'US:
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE "POSTSOCIALIST" CONDITION 23 (Routledge 1997).
177. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2620, 2644 (2014).
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on women's free emotional labor. This maintains the historical
devaluation of feminized and racialized labor in an economy increasingly devoted to the work of care, but protects and further aligns the
interests of the "ideal family'' and the state. 178
It may be an impossibility for domestic workers and home-care
workers to translate their labor into "collective bodily presence" within
the hierarchical bargaining model used by public sector unions. 179
It is only feminist social justice movement organizing that can provide a framework for the recognition that leads to economic justice
in the care economy.
Obama's executive order requiring overtime and minimum
wage for home-care workers corrects the racist and sexist exclusion
from the Fair Labor Standards Act. 180 But it corrects this wrong of
the past without providing a floor for the future of low-income
women workers and cannot mandate a shift in the care economy's
exploitation of women. Such an order fails, like the Supreme Court
and FMLA, to redress the unequal distribution of precarity as a
chronic condition. Poor women, and more especially women of color,
have to assert their labor as that which structures public policies of
care in both the positive and negative sense. Public policy is still
designed to create women of color as the structuring absence of
gender- and race-neutral public policies designed to provide social
and economic citizenship for some receivers and givers of care and
to deny others redistribution, recognition, and representation. 181
Journalist Liza Featherstone puts it this way: feminism needs
to be concerned with those "whose bodies prevent them from creating profits for capital" because the contempt with which they are
treated shows us that we are all disposable. 182 This requires struggling against feminist historical collusion with capitalist eugenic
framing of the body, including forced sterilization, and the use of
state systems to exploit the care of women of color.
178. See id. at 2620--44.
179. Judith Butler, Precarity Talk, 56:4 TDR 163, 168 (Winter 2012).
180. See Court Reinstates Wage Rules for Home Care Workers, CBS NEWS (Aug. 21,
2015, 11:01 AM), https://www .cbsnews.com/news/court-reinstates-wage-rules-for-home
-care-workers [https://perma.cdM38F-UR98].
181. For another example of this in relation to domestic work, see Governor Jerry
Brown's Veto of the California Domestic Workers Bill of Rights. Sheila Bapat, In Move
that Stunned Advocates, Jerry Brown Vetoes Domestic Workers' Bill of Rights, REwiRE
(Oct. I, 2012, 11:57 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2012110/01/love-and-strategy-can-con
quer-all-ca-govemor-vetoes-domestic-workers-bill-rights [https://perma.cc/48EA-7DY8]
(claiming that it represented too great a cost for the disabled and elderly to ensure the
labor rights of nannies, home health care aides and housekeepers).
182. Is Class Out? Gender Solidarity and the Class Divide in an Age of Economic
Inequality, VIMEO (Sept. 13, 2014), https:/lvimeo.com/112718456 [https://perma.cc/5W3F
-3W4H].

